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Abstract 
Karl Popper argued that science proceeds not by induction but by offering explanatory theories 
which scientists then attempt to falsify.  What cannot be falsified, falls outside the realm of 
science.  In applying his ideas to the writing of history Popper was particularly scathing about 
Marxist predictions of future historical development.  But he did believe history could be written 
by looking at the situations historical figures found themselves in and the problems they 
attempted to solve.  Pentecostal historiography has been divided into four main types: the 
providential, the historical roots, the multicultural and the functional.  When each of these types 
is analysed and judged against Popper’s strictures against induction, we find, among other things, 
that the unfashionable providential account need not be ruled out.  
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Introduction 
Karl Popper (1902-94) is probably the 20th century’s most influential philosopher of science.  His 
work is extensive and this paper concentrates on two aspects of it.  First is his discussion of the 
scientific method and the history of science.  His view of science is determined by the principle 
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of falsification.  In essence he argued that scientific theories are those which can be falsified, and 
that good scientific theories are those which explain a wider range of phenomena than less good 
scientific theories.1  Absolute knowledge within science is unattainable but falsification provides 
the means by which greater degrees of certainty can be approached.  In essence, the scientist tries 
to disprove his or her own theories.2  The more stringent these attempts are and the more 
decisively they fail, the greater the confidence that can be given to the theories. 
 
His discussion of falsification arises from his reflection upon the problem of induction.  The old 
notion of science stemming from Bacon was that large general laws could be abstracted from 
numerous instances.3  The problem with induction within science is, as Popper pointed out, that a 
single counter-instance can invalidate thousands of instances and we never know whether a 
counter-instance might be just around the corner.  We might predict that all crows are black 
because we have seen 10,000 black crows but when, quite unexpectedly, we meet an albino 
crow, the law which states that all crows are black is immediately exploded.  Falsification as the 
antidote to the flaws of induction was tenaciously defended by Popper throughout his life once 
he had ‘solved the problem’.  
 
By applying falsification both to the defining characteristics of science and to the method of 
science, Popper was in a position to rewrite scientific history.  All those disciplines which fell 
outside his method (like alchemy) could simply be ignored while all those disciplines which 
                                                 
1
 In Popper’s words ‘theories are essentially argumentative systems of statements’ in K.R. Popper, 
“Autobiography”, in P. A. Schlipp (ed) The Philosophy of Karl Popper (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974), p. 61. 
2
 P. B. Medawar, Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought (Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 
1969). 
3
 F. Bacon Novum Organon, first published in 1620.  A more recent re-issue is edited by Lisa Jardine and Michael 
Silverthorne, The New Organon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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were testable and generated falsifiable explanatory theories could be included.  This allowed him 
to trace the story of scientific ideas and, in a paradigmatic example, demonstrate how Newtonian 
physics was properly replaced by Einsteinian physics.4  Both types of physics explain the same 
range of phenomena and both can be subjected to falsification but the theories of Einstein also 
explain additional phenomena and deal with anomalies that had over time crept into the 
Newtonian account. 
 
Second, Popper dealt with the development of society.  His particular target here was the 
propagation of ideologically-driven grand theories of society, most particularly communism, 
which rested upon no proper empirical basis and which sought to bring vast changes into play 
without any attempt at falsification or small-scale implementation.  Marxism, and indeed fascism 
of which Popper himself was a victim, developed totalising explanations of society which not 
only encompassed social and economic propositions but also sought to control the functions of 
the state in regard to science, history, philosophy and other intellectual activities.  Any general 
history influenced by Popper will give no ground to Marxist or fascist ‘laws’ of social 
development.  Moreover, it will ardently contest the notion of ‘false consciousness’, a pre-
emptive argumentative tactic used by Marxists to dismiss the theorisation of any opposing social 
group.5  
 
Popperian history writing 
If we approach this issue through Popper’s work, then we find his fullest discussion of history in 
The Poverty of Historicism (1944) and The Open Society and its Enemies (1945).  At the time 
                                                 
4
 E.g. in Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1965). 
5
 See an example of this bitter debate discussed in, D. Frisby, “The Popper-Adorno Controversy: the Methodological 
Dispute in German Sociology”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 2 (1972), pp. 105-119. 
William K Kay The Science of History 
 
 4 
when he wrote, ‘historicism’ was attractive to German historians.  This was the attempt by 
scientifically-minded historians to provide an account of the past that could be used to predict the 
future.  The idea was that any complete theory of societal development that could be 
substantiated from historical examples could then be projected forward to future events.  
Actually, the discussion was more subtle than this since Marxists, who were the chief 
propagators of this view, agreed that within definable epochs human decision-making could 
adjust what would otherwise be completely predetermined.  They understood human beings 
could learn from history and deliberately avoid repeating earlier patterns of events.  Yet, even 
though human agents might be able to influence the course of individual epochs, the actual 
sequence of the epochs was beyond human control and would follow the ‘iron’ laws of history.6   
 
Popper’s detestation of historicism ran deep but his refutation of it was measured and logical.  
He argued that the course of human history depends upon the development of human knowledge 
and that, in principle and by definition, new knowledge is not knowable in advance.7  If it were 
knowable, it would not be new.  It is therefore impossible for human history to be predicted or 
reduced to a single explanatory theory.  By contrast, scientific explanatory theories earned 
credibility precisely in this way.  They predicted critical events - critical in the sense that, if they 
failed to occur, the theories could be shown to be wrong.  In many situations these events needed 
to be repeatable to allow proper scrutiny. Since historical events could not be manipulated and 
forced to repeat themselves, the testing of historical theories was well-nigh impossible.  The 
same kind of considerations applied to the theory of evolution.  This is why Popper categorised 
                                                 
6
 Alan Donagan, “Popper’s examination of historicism”, in P. A. Schlipp (ed) The Philosophy of Karl Popper (La 
Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974), p. 913. 
7
 Where knowledge is a ‘system of statements - theories submitted for discussion’ in Karl R. Popper 
“Autobiography”, in P. A. Schlipp (ed) The Philosophy of Karl Popper (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974), p. 68. 
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the theory of evolution as a metaphysical theory rather than a scientific one.  It was a theory that 
created a framework in which science could be carried out but it was not in itself scientific in the 
sense of being open to falsification.   
 
Yet it would be a mistake to think that Popper denied the usefulness of historical theories.  He 
fully saw that the historian must select from the multitude of details a path through the jungle of 
possible interpretations so as to present a coherent narrative.  What he objected to was the 
classification of historical theories as historical laws.  He appreciated that historicism arose out 
of the reaction against a naive account of history as being driven by the commanding actions of 
kings and generals.  His answer to the difficulty of writing history was to propose that historians 
must introduce a ‘preconceived selective point of view’ to allow a choice to be made of all the 
material available.8  This selectivity does indeed function ‘in some ways analogous to those of 
theories in science’ which explains why historical generalisations have sometimes been 
misunderstood as historical laws.9  So the historian needs to inform the reader of the point of 
view that determines the selection and interpretation of facts and then to ignore all those other 
facts that have no bearing on the line being pursued. 
 
In dealing with the historical actions of individuals there is room for a detailed account of the 
‘logic of situations’ to which sociology can contribute its analysis.  The logic of the situation 
illuminates the choices available to individuals and this, together with an understanding of the 
functioning of social institutions, can allow models to be constructed that historians may use for 
                                                 
8
 Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 150. 
9
 Ibid p. 151. 
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the purpose of explanation.10  Institutions bulk large in the proposal that Popper gives since 
institutions are collective expressions of human values and rationality.  It is through the 
examination of ideas by means of institutional scrutiny that rationality advances knowledge.  The 
public character of science embodied in its institutions preserves the objectivity of science, 
where objectivity is seen as inter-subjective agreement reached by a rational critique. A theory of 
progress that focuses upon institutions is consequently highly desirable.   
 
The notion of the logic of situations is compatible with Popper’s notion of scientific (and indeed 
artistic) progress being made by the solving of problems.  Neither science nor art is a matter of 
self-expression nor of random discoveries.  Rather, science and art progress by using the 
technical means at their disposal to solve the problems of the world in the tradition left behind by 
the intellectual efforts of their predecessors.11  In its own way history writing may also be seen as 
the attempt to solve historical problems even if, as indicated above, it is also written with a view 
to satisfying the interests of the individual historian.  As we shall see, such interests impinge 
upon an account of the world as a place where scientifically described regularities occur.  Can a 
religious historian use theories that run counter to scientific theories?  
 
Other history writing  
Before answering the Popperian questions, we need to take a short digression through other 
approaches to history writing. 
 
                                                 
10
 Ibid.  p. 149.  See also Langdon Gilkey, “Problems and Possibilities of Theological Models: responding to David 
Klem and William Klink”, Zygon 38: 3 (September 2003), pp. 529-534. 
11
 ‘Organisms are problem-solving rather than end-pursuing’ in Karl R. Popper, “Autobiography”, in P. A. Schlipp 
(ed) The Philosophy of Karl Popper (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974) p. 142. 
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In a discussion of historiography at the 20th annual SPS meeting in Dallas, Texas, in 1990, I 
outlined the problems facing the historian of Pentecostalism.12  In short, nearly all the significant 
leaders and preachers involved in the Pentecostal movement from the beginning have entertained 
a strong belief in Providence.  They believed not only that their own lives were shaped by God, 
but also that the human race as a whole was moving in a direction consonant with a biblical 
eschatological scheme.  The historian of Pentecostalism is placed in a position where he or she 
must either attempt to remain uncommitted about the miraculous and the workings of Providence 
or else side with the participants in the narration.13  I showed how some Pentecostal historians 
managed to explain what the participants believed about healing and answered prayer without 
themselves revealing whether they thought such beliefs were justified.  In these instances the 
authorial voice of the historian remains studiedly neutral.  In other instances the Pentecostal 
historian comes off the fence to say that this or that event was indeed an answer to prayer, an act 
of God, and so on.14  Yet, even when the Pentecostal historian attempts to remain neutral, the 
selection of the material that is presented to the reader may well carry a covert message.  The 
overarching point here is that modern historiographical methods are inhospitable to accounts of 
the miraculous; this generates an inevitable tension.  
 
In an article in Pneuma in 1997 Augustus Cerillo offered four different approaches to the history 
of American Pentecostal origins.  The first was the providential approach illustrated in such 
books as Carl Brumback’s Suddenly... From Heaven: a history of the Assemblies of God (1961).  
                                                 
12
 William K. Kay, “Three Generations on: the methodology of Pentecostal history”, Twentieth Annual Meeting of 
the Society for Pentecostal Studies, November 8-10, 1990, and later published in the EPTA Bulletin, X:1 & 2, 
(1992), pp. 58-70.  
13
 E.g. Edith L. Blumhofer, The Assemblies of God: A chapter in the story of American Pentecostalism, 2 vols. 
(Springfield: Gospel Publishing House, 1989). 
14
 E.g. Charles W. Conn, Like a Mighty Army: A History of the Church of God, (Tennessee: Pathway Press, 1977). 
And, sometimes, Gary B. McGee, This Gospel Shall Be Preached 2 vols. (Springfield: Gospel Publishing House, 
1986-1989). 
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The second was the historical roots approach which followed Wesleyan and holiness lines of 
enquiry and revealed the complicated institutional, theological and experiential strands that 
ultimately eventuated in 20th century Pentecostalism.  The third was the multicultural approach 
that sought to redefine Pentecostalism as a multicultural phenomenon springing from African 
and Afro-American impulses within American culture and arguing that only by understanding 
the partnerships and contributions of African contributors can Pentecostalism be properly 
comprehended.  The fourth was a functional approach which saw the function of Pentecostalism 
as a means by which psychologically maladjusted migrants in the new American cities recreated 
the religious habitus of their origins or in other ways found in religion a psychological antidote to 
their own disorientation and marginalisation.  In the Cerillo’s view each of the approaches helps 
‘illuminate the broad contours that shaped the new Pentecostal movement’. 
 
These approaches by no means exhaust the possibilities. More recent accounts of history as an 
academic discipline show that there are those who simply want to get on with the job of writing 
history without plunging into epistemological disputes.15  They want to steer a course between 
unbridled subjectivity and impossible objectivity -- whatever these terms exactly mean.  Others 
want to improve standards of logic and argumentation within history and to ‘refuse 
epistemological doubt in favour of analytical rigour’.  Yet others want to shake off post-
modernist doubts over the nature of evidence and to re-engage earlier explanatory discourses.  If 
                                                 
15
 Penelope Corfield, “The state of history: review article”, Journal of Contemporary History, 36:1, (2001) pp. 153-
161 provides an excellent overview from which this paragraph is taken.  The article covers Miles Fairburn, Social 
History: problems, strategies and methods (London: Macmillan, 1999); Brian Fay, Philip Pomper and Richard T 
Vann, eds, History and Theory: contemporary readings (Blackwell: Oxford, 1998); Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and 
Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, eds, Reconstructing History: the emergency of a new historical society (New York: 
Routledge, 1999); Anna Green and Kathleen Troup, eds, The Houses of History: a critical reader in twentieth-
century history and theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); Ludmilla Jordanova, History in 
Practice (London: Arnold, 2000); S.H. Rigby Marxism and History: a critical introduction, 2nd edn. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998). 
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some historians focus on social, cultural, gender, sexual, familial and ‘identity’ history, then so 
be it.  Yet others wish to turn away from empiricism towards theory, particularly literary theory 
that embraces self-reflexiveness and a whole repertoire of rhetorical devices like irony and 
comedy.  Indeed such history sees itself as being closer to literature than science.  This only 
underlies the debate between postmoderns who are sceptical about the possibility of any secure 
knowledge and those who feel such scepticism may subvert social coherence or the profession of 
history itself. 
 
In a large-scale and recent survey of historiography, John Burrow has shown that the writing of 
history as a genre is part of Western culture as a whole and has been highly influential over the 
years as a ‘receptacle for the concerns of that culture’.  This is especially so as European 
societies have attached immense importance to versions of their pasts and sought in historical 
writings for legendary, heroic, tragic and pathetic motifs as well as for inspiring and military 
rhetoric.16  History writing has been concerned with the distinctness of European civilisation 
contrasted with the empires of Asia, with national identity and national liberation, with 
republican virtue (drawing on Roman precedent), with giving a voice to oppressed minorities and 
with tracing the course of the development of constitutions and nation states. 
 
Historians have brought to their voluminous writings the philosophical and religious 
predispositions that animated their own lives.  Burrow, however, is not dismissive of historians 
who believed in Providence like, for example, Eusebius and Bede.  Eusebius, writing after the 
conversion of Constantine, was concerned to establish doctrinal orthodoxy and, for this reason, 
took trouble to quote his sources ‘with the ironic result of bringing his practice closer to that of 
                                                 
16
 John Burrow, A History of Histories, (London: Allen Lane, 2007), p. xvii. 
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modern historians, just as the religious controversies of the Reformation were later to do’.17  
Bede, writing with a didactic purpose of encouraging good conduct by recording notable 
examples of goodness and wickedness, found his belief in Providence leading him to discuss 
political situations in a way analogous to that taken by the writers of the books of Samuel and 
Kings on whom he had written an earlier commentary.  In other words belief in Providence led 
historians to value and analyse the activities of individuals in a way that was quite distinct from 
those historians whose motivations were prompted by abstract secular theories.  Moreover, belief 
in Providence was perfectly compatible with a belief in the ‘Whig interpretation of history’, that 
is, the interpretation of history that saw it as proceeding upon a gentle upward path of human 
enlightenment and progress.  In addition, as Burrow points out, histories of science were 
intrinsically Whig in their orientation since science is always seen as getting better and better.18 
 
Practical and theoretical conclusions  
In practical terms: the Pentecostal historian who takes heed to Popper’s ideas will avoid 
inductive reasoning.  This means that the Pentecostal historian who has a particular theory to 
propose will not attempt to prove his or her theory by multiple instances.  This would be to stray 
too near to the process of induction.  Yet, in many histories this is what tends to happen.  The 
historian looks for illustrations to support a theory and ignores all the counter-illustrations that 
might falsify the theory.  When the book is closed, the reader is left with the impression that the 
theory has been amply substantiated. 
 
                                                 
17
 Ibid. p. 191. 
18
 Ibid, p. 474. 
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It is evident that theology is a rich storehouse of abstract notions and that these can function for 
the Pentecostal historian as the source of numerous theories.  The most comprehensive and 
simple is that of Providence but this is a theory which is not susceptible to falsification since it is 
always possible to attribute a disaster to hidden sinfulness.  Although Pentecostal historians will 
instinctively attribute the worldwide success of Pentecostalism within the 20th century to 
providential activity, it is also clear that there are parts of the world where Pentecostal doctrine 
and Christian life have failed to penetrate and triumph.  However, following Popper there is, as 
we have said, nothing wrong in using Providence as an organising framework, and Pentecostal 
historians should not be ashamed of doing so given the compatibility of providential impulses 
with Whig ideas of progress, including scientific progress. 
 
The three other types of history-writing outlined by Cerillo, and used by Pentecostal historians, 
can be further commented on in the light of Popper’s ideas.  Each of these types can be analysed 
so as to unpack its conception more precisely.  The historical roots approach depends, first, on 
the identification of the phenomenon, whether it be the formation of Pentecostalism as a whole 
or Pentecostal denominations or a movement allied to Pentecostalism like the charismatic 
movement, and the analysis of this phenomenon into its constituent elements.  Once the analysis 
has taken place, then, in the second step, the constituent elements need to be tracked back in 
time.  The elements may be ideas or institutional forms or even persisting economic relations and 
the presumption of the historical roots approach is that every element can be accounted for by 
prior activity: that the past might influence the present but that the present can have no causative 
purchase on the past.  The process of tracking back is the key concern of the historical roots 
approach since it aims to identify precursors, antecedents and prototypes of what subsequently 
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came to full fruition.  The notion is that the tracking back process might take place through the 
transmission of doctrines, by contact between people through face-to-face meetings or through 
the publication or letters or by more indirect and subtle influences related to the existence of 
common conditions between the past and the event that is being examined.  Third, the historical 
narrative can be constructed, but now told forwards beginning in the past and working towards 
the event whose roots have been traced.  The historical roots approach therefore displays the 
characteristics of a detective story where the author knows the murderer from the beginning but 
the reader does not.19 
 
The multicultural approach uses culture as a superordinate category.  It needs to be pointed out 
that any superordinate category could be used and that culture, which can be a broad and ill-
defined concept associated with the way of life of a definable human group, is particularly 
appropriate for this sort of exercise.  The existence of culture is rarely denied and the term is 
broad enough to include subcultures, high arts (like opera and the leisure pursuits of the educated 
and wealthy) or lifestyle choices and habits (like slang, characteristic modes of dress, food 
preferences).  But it can also include low culture encompassing the leisure pursuits of the less 
well educated and poorer members of society (as, in Britain, greyhound racing as opposed to 
horse racing, eating fish and chips as opposed to fine dining, and so on).  The first step in any 
multicultural history is to select the social and ethnic members of the group that is going to be 
the focus of the historian’s attention.  Thus a cultural method might include simply black 
musicians rather than the entirety of Afro-Americans but it could equally include women, 
children, disabled people, converts from Catholicism or any social group with describable 
                                                 
19
 Donald W. Dayton, Theological Roots of Pentecostalism (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1987) is the most obvious 
and distinguished example. 
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attitudes and lifestyles.  Indeed, it immediately comes apparent that culture, being such a broad 
and slippery concept, is in danger of attracting misleading generalisations.  Nevertheless, the 
second step is to look for traces of the culture of the particular group that has been selected in the 
Pentecostal movement as a whole with, as the third step, the intention of highlighting the special 
contribution of the group that has been selected.  And, as a fourth step, the process then proceeds 
in the same way as the historical roots method by tracking back in time to see the earlier 
contribution of the selected group within emerging Pentecostalism.  
 
The functional approach begins by looking at the functions of Pentecostalism, either social or 
psychological.20  These functions may involve benefits that are peripheral to its stated theology.  
Pentecostalism may function to raise the educational level of disadvantaged children, to provide 
credit networks for the poor, to organise factory workers, to provide a strong rationale against 
wasting money on excessive alcohol or drugs or to provide an answer to existential angst and 
meaning for first-generation migrant blue-collar workers, and any number of other possibilities.  
Once the functions of Pentecostal and have been identified to the historian’s satisfaction, all that 
is necessary is to find a group for which the functions are desirable and then to tell the story 
Pentecostalism in the light of this group.  The classic account here is Vision of the Disinherited 
which effectively explains the rise Pentecostalism through its social and psychological utility 
rather than by any supernatural or providential causation.21   
 
                                                 
20
 Some of these are outlined by Kilian McDonnell, Charismatic Renewal and the Churches (New York: Seabury 
Press, 1976, p. 20f) which instances, among other writers, Anton T. Boisen, Religion in Crisis and Custom: a 
sociological and psychological study (New York: Harper & Row, 1945). 
21
 Robert M. Anderson, Vision of the Disinherited (Oxford: OUP, 1979). 
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An application of Popper’s line of thought to the historical roots approach would at least note 
that there was a non-inductive and non-predictive norm within this type of history writing, 
especially as its concern was to trace lines of influence through human or institutional agencies 
rather than as a consequence of grand historical theories.  The multicultural approach is similarly 
non-inductive and non-predictive.  It is the functional approach that tends to be inductive in the 
sense that it looks for multiple instances of the particular function that it has identified as being 
powerfully explanatory of Pentecostal success.  Vision of the Disinherited presumes that it is the 
provision of religious meaning for many erstwhile farm workers at the end of the 19th century 
that is the particular contribution of Pentecostalism.  Once this presumption is made, then 
instances have to be found to support the case.  Once this presumption is made, also, some type 
of prediction may arise.  Even so, the functional approach may, despite itself, attract credence 
resulting from its implicit imaginative sympathy.  This is because the approach depends upon 
identifying a lasting psychological need that human beings today can attribute to human beings a 
hundred years ago.  Human beings today can appreciate the need for meaning and purpose at a 
time of social change, the need for the protection of the poor, and so on, and thus despite its 
focus on functionality the approach also builds upon the notion of unchanging human nature. 
 
In theoretical terms: we return to our original point of departure.  While it is clear that the 
roots approach, the multicultural approach and the functional approach would be able to operate 
without any substantial reference to miracles, answered prayer, prophecy, and other divine 
interventions, it is equally clear that the providential approach is almost bound to make reference 
to these phenomena.  And, if the providential approach does this, is it effectively running counter 
to the great weight of scientific theory and thought and perversely allowing unfalsifiable 
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statements and falsified worldviews into an historical narrative?  While it would be perverse to 
tell the history of science from the perspective of a narrator who denied the validity of scientific 
methods, it is not perverse to permit an historian who has an interest in a religion expressing this 
through historical models that make use of the beliefs and practices of religious actors within the 
historical process.  For the religious actor, the logic of the situation may be quite different from 
the logic of the same situation perceived by a non-religious actor.  In this way Popper’s case does 
not preclude the writing of history from a religious point of view.  Thus, Popper, as we have said, 
will direct attention to the human actors of history – whether religious or not - and the 
predicaments in which they found themselves and the problems they solved.   
 
In short, Popper gives Pentecostal historians at least five things: (a) according to my deductions 
he does not, as others do, rule out Providence (b) he warns against a method that is simply the 
collection of examples and the ignoring or suppression of counter-examples (c) he warns against 
trying to predict the future from the past and (d) he would perhaps only have reservations about 
the functional approach discussed above.  Lastly, (e) he encourages us to view individuals as 
making important decisions to extricate themselves from predicaments and in this way 
discourages us from seeing historical development as being driven by abstract forces. 
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